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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2162
___________
DENNIS SHIPMAN, on behalf of his minor child K.S.
v.
ALICIA ALI BROOKS
Dennis Shipman,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D. Del. Civil No. 1-14-cv-01472)
District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 19, 2016
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 2, 2016)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Dennis Shipman, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware dismissing his civil rights action. For the reasons that
follow, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.1
On December 10, 2014, Shipman filed a complaint against his son’s mother in
District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Shipman asked the District Court to review
and vacate a November 25, 2014 order of the Delaware Supreme Court affirming a
Delaware Family Court decision that granted by default judgment custody of his son to
his son’s mother. Shipman alleged that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction and failed to
follow state law and procedures. He claimed that the state court orders violate his rights
to due process and equal protection and his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Shipman also moved to recuse the District Judge assigned to his case.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The District Court explained that the
Rooker-Feldman2 doctrine barred review of the Delaware state court decisions, that the
Court must abstain to the extent the guardianship action remained pending in state court,
and that, while the parties were presumably citizens of different states, the domestic
relations exception to diversity jurisdiction applied. The District Court also denied
Shipman’s motion for recusal. This appeal followed.

1

This appeal was previously dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee. We grant
Shipman’s motion to reopen his appeal and motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
2

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
2

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standard of review of the
order of dismissal is plenary. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.
1999). We review the denial of the recusal motion for abuse of discretion. Jones v.
Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir. 1990).
We agree with the District Court that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Shipman’s
complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which established that federal district
courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.
Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir.
2010). “[T]here are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of
injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before
the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and
reject the state judgments.” Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).
These requirements are squarely met here. Shipman lost in state court when the
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the Family Court’s custody order. The state court
judgments were rendered before he filed his complaint in District Court. As noted above,
Shipman asks the District Court to vacate the state court decisions for lack of jurisdiction
and failure to follow state law and procedures. To the extent Shipman claims violations
of his rights to due process and equal protection and his Fourth Amendment rights, these

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 3

claims stem from the state court decisions. See id. at 166-67 (federal court lacks
jurisdiction when the source of the injury is the state court judgment as opposed to the
defendant’s actions).3 Because we conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies,
we need not address the other reasons advanced by the District Court in dismissing the
complaint.
We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Shipman’s motion for recusal. Shipman sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) based
on the District Judge’s adverse rulings in his other cases. As recognized by the District
Court, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). To the extent Shipman
contends that the District Judge formed opinions based on events occurring in his other
proceedings, he has not shown a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make
fair judgment impossible.” Id.
Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will
summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. Shipman’s motion to stay his
appeal is denied.

3

Shipman also asserted in his complaint that a constitutional challenge to a state statutory
scheme is cognizable under § 1983, but he did not bring such a challenge.
4

